The Effects of Trade Openness on Per Capita GDP during Banking Crises by Brozdowski, Alexander J.
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects 
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects 
Spring 5-1-2011 
The Effects of Trade Openness on Per Capita GDP during Banking 
Crises 
Alexander J. Brozdowski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone 
 Part of the E-Commerce Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brozdowski, Alexander J., "The Effects of Trade Openness on Per Capita GDP during Banking Crises" 
(2011). Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects. 284. 
https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/284 
This Honors Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Syracuse University Honors Program 
Capstone Projects at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Trade Openness on Per Capita GDP 
during Banking Crises 
 
   
A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at Syracuse University 
and the 
Program of Distinction in Economics at Syracuse University 
 
   
 
Alexander J. Brozdowski 
 
Candidate for 
B.A., Economics Degree 
B.A., Political Science Degree 
Renée Crown University Honors 
and Distinction in Economics 
 
April 2011 
 
      
 
   
  Honors Capstone Project in _________Economics_________ 
 
 
Capstone Project Advisor: __________________________ 
                                                             Professor Christopher Rohlfs 
 
Honors Reader: __________________________________ 
                                                                 Professor Don Dutkowsky 
   
Honors Director: __________________________________ 
                                                           James Spencer, Interim Director 
 
Date: ______________________________________________ 
  
 
Abstract 
 This paper examines the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth effects of country trade volume interacted with the recent occurrence of 
banking crisis. Panel macroeconomic data availability permits the inclusion of 
banking crises which have occurred worldwide over roughly the past five decades.  
 Linear regression results provide suggestive evidence that greater trade 
volume, interacted with the recent occurrence of a banking crisis, may have a large, 
positive effect on real per capita GDP. A 100 point openness index increase causes 
an average increase of approximately 2.3% per capita GDP when interacted with the 
presence of a banking crisis. A change from autarky (index zero) to high openness 
(index 100), for example, substantially offsets the average negative effect of a 
banking crisis at openness = 0, approximately -6.9% per capita GDP. However, this 
measurement is imprecise, with robust standard errors of approximately 0.022, or 
2.2% of per capita GDP.  
 Additionally, greater trade openness may aid in the recovery of per capita 
GDP following a banking crisis. At openness = 0, the average annual effect of each 
of the ten years following a crisis is -0.2% GDP per capita, approaching statistical 
significance with robust standard errors of 0.17% GDP per capita, giving the 10-year 
recovery period a total impact of -2.0% GDP per capita. Interacting openness with 
years-since-crisis, however, yields an average increase of 0.3% per capita GDP per 
annum, per 100 openness index points, during the recovery period. This 
measurement is less precise, however, with robust standard errors of 0.33% GDP 
per capita. In other words, a banking crisis may put lasting, downward pressure on 
GDP if no trade is allowed. 
 I hypothesize that greater preexisting openness may offer countries more 
options to maintain their consumption components of real per capita GDP via 
substitution (importing), or to pursue export-led growth policies more easily, as high 
trade volume would imply the preexistence of developed physical and legal 
infrastructure for trade activity. Further research is warranted to investigate these 
mechanisms with greater precision, and to determine if trade openness is serving as a 
proxy variable for flexibility or resiliency in financial markets, financial openness, 
generally competent macro policy management or another unknown variable.  
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Preface
This paper represents my first econometric study. It serves as both my 
Capstone Project for the Renée Crown University Honors Program and as my 
undergraduate thesis for the Program of Distinction in Economics at Syracuse 
University. The work itself was conducted through the Economics Department, 
which supports this small corps of students (six, during the 2010-2011 academic 
year) with a full-time professor, as a two-semester, credited course sequence.  
Chris Rohlfs, my advising professor, imposed strict standards for research 
design in terms of causality. In other words, topics yielding only correlative results 
were not acceptable. This restriction is industry best practice, so to speak, but it also 
limits the types of questions that a researcher may ask.  
Most of my early topic proposals did not make the cut. They were broad 
lines of inquiry in which only opaque, correlative relationships were likely to be 
found. An example would have been a global study of the economic precursors to 
armed conflict. The topic proved too murky, too devoid of sound data containing 
the clear, exogenous “shocks” upon which natural experimental design pivots.  
I found a more manageable alternative in what might be considered the 
consolidated field of international macroeconomics and finance, which I had been 
studying during this paper’s conceptual stage. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was 
still the elephant in the room, and I was fascinated by its mechanics. But I was also 
struck by how much economists still did not know about financial crises, especially 
given their destructive power. Each case study seemed to contain at least one 
unresolved economic debate, suggesting plentiful opportunities for new research.  
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I had already come into contact with the recent work of Carmen Reinhart 
and Kenneth Rogoff on the history of financial crisis, and thought that their simple, 
yet unique datasets on banking crises could make an excellent starting point. I had 
read quite a bit on the effects of financial openness as it relates to both economic 
growth and crisis management, but this was mostly presented in theoretical terms. 
What I wanted to see were some hard numbers.   
It turned out, however, that I hadn’t seen many hard numbers about financial 
openness for a reason: by and large, the data does not exist. I began framing my 
regressions with a crude proxy variable – trade openness – as a placeholder, while 
looking for better measurements of financial openness. But once I ran a few 
regressions on the trade openness variable, it seemed to have an interesting effect all 
by itself, and potentially a very large one. So I changed course, back into uncharted 
territory.  
This study has given me firsthand exposure to the capricious nature of 
discovery. It is part diligence and part intuition, but also part accident. I complete 
this paper having gained more questions than answers. Indeed, I believe that is what 
has made the experience worthwhile.  
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Advice to Students 
Research early, research often. It is far easier to have too much detail and 
make cuts than it is to scramble to fill in missing details. Ask questions. Econometric 
analysis is not easy, even for Ph.D.s; you are not alone. Stare at your data. Then stare 
at them some more. Be able to tell a story about what the numbers mean.  
Make sure you can clearly verbalize just what your models are measuring. 
Know the strengths and weaknesses of the methods that you have used. Be open 
and honest about them, both in writing and in oral presentations. Try to imagine 
other ways you might have conducted your study, so you can explain why you 
ultimately chose the methods you did. If you need to, go back to your textbooks and 
your notes to refresh yourself on what the best modeling techniques might be for 
your data.  
Do not hesitate to contact professional researchers with authority on your 
topic. But if you do, familiarize yourself with their work first so you’re not asking 
them to spoon-feed you.  Researchers spend a lot of time with their work, so 
chances are good that they will open up if you show genuine interest. Personal 
relationships can help you overcome dead-ends; strangers get locked out. 
If you can, present your findings formally to a panel of professors with 
knowledge of your topic. This is a good way to obtain a lot of sound advice on your 
research very quickly. You will get more people to commit to a 30-minute 
presentation than to read your entire paper, so use this opportunity to supplement 
your readers’ line editing.   
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I. Introduction 
 
In the field of financial crisis analysis, attention is mainly focused on financial 
variables. At most, trade balance may be addressed as a component of the current 
account balance. But trade openness – a country’s relative volume of trade – is 
seldom discussed. Meanwhile, the effects of trade openness on long-term per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth, development and productivity have been 
studied extensively, albeit with mixed results (Bekaert; Easterly). This study attempts 
to identify a linkage between the economic openness literature and financial crisis 
literature, which have largely remained separate. To accomplish this, the present 
study examines the historical per capita GDP growth effects of trade openness when 
interacted with the occurrence of a banking crisis. 
Simply possessing well-developed physical and legal facilities to execute trade 
transactions may make trade policies easier to execute. In other words, countries that 
are relatively more “practiced” at trade may be able to use trade more easily as a 
policy tool. Ready availability of foreign exchange from trade transactions could also 
provide some cushioning in the event of a crisis (Gerber Ch. 12, Montiel Ch. 19). It 
is plausible then that a country’s sheer volume of trade might enhance a country’s 
ability to mitigate the recessionary effects of financial crisis through trade. I will state 
some specific hypotheses on the mechanics of this process in later sections. This 
paper serves as a point of departure, encouraging researchers to more closely 
examine whether trade for trade’s sake promises some previously-unrecognized 
benefits to the countries of the world, beyond productivity and growth. 
The estimation strategy for this study involves standard, linear, ordinary least 
squares regressions run on large, macroeconomic panel datasets. The dataset is 
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narrowed to include only data from 10 years before a given crisis through 10 years 
afterward, including the initial year, for a total of 21 country-years per crisis 
observation. These ranges are truncated in cases toward the beginning and end of the 
dataset where further data is unavailable, and in cases of overlapping “serial” crisis 
periods. 
I calculate average trade openness indexes for each affected country over the 
four country-years directly preceding the onset of a banking crisis, plus the crisis 
initial year, for a five-year openness average. I then interact this variable with a 
dummy variable for country post-crisis status, assigned to the 10 country-years 
following that banking crisis. I then regress this interaction term on the natural log of 
real per capita GDP to isolate the interaction term’s effects on per capita GDP 
growth. I progressively add controls over five specifications, the final specification 
controlling for time trend; country fixed effects; country-specific trends, or the 
interaction term between country and year; and finally, year fixed effects. 
I draw my banking crisis dates and locations from Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008), and macroeconomic panel data from Version 6.3 of the Penn World Tables 
(Heston et al). The data were merged to form a strongly balanced panel, including 
153 unique country-crises over the period from 1963 to 2007.  
 Linear regression results provide suggestive evidence that greater trade volume, 
interacted with the recent occurrence of a banking crisis, may have a large, positive 
effect on real per capita GDP. A 100 point openness index increase caused an 
average increase of approximately 2.3% per capita GDP when interacted with the 
presence of a banking crisis. A change from autarky (index zero) to high openness 
(index 100), for example, would substantially offset the average negative effect of a 
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banking crisis at openness = 0, approximately -6.9% per capita GDP. However, this 
measurement is very imprecise, with robust standard errors of approximately 0.022, 
or 2.2% of real GDP per capita.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the data 
sources and characteristics of this study in greater detail; Section III further describes 
the regression modeling strategy employed; Section IV discusses the results of the 
study; and Section V gives concluding remarks. Bibliographical information is 
provided thereafter, followed by a data appendix containing the tabulated regression 
results referenced in the report; a corresponding table of means; and two versions of 
the historical crisis data adapted from Reinhart and Rogoff. Finally, the report 
includes an extended summary for administrative use.  
 
II. Data 
Data Source 1: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
Crisis data is drawn from Reinhart and Rogoff’s 2008 paper, “This Time is 
Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises,” specifically 
“Table A3: Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800-2007,” which tabulates 
historical occurrences of banking crises. Because it is often difficult to mark the end 
date of a banking crisis, the data include only initiation years. I describe my method 
for handling this limitation in the Data Description subsection below.  
In their study, Reinhart and Rogoff mark a banking crisis “by two types of 
events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public 
sector of one or more financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial 
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institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar 
outcomes for other financial institutions” (Reinhart and Rogoff 81). The Type I 
crisis is considered “systemic,” and more severe than the Type II crisis, summarized 
by Reinhart and Rogoff as an episode of milder “financial distress” (ibid.). Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s summary tables do not discriminate between the two types, however; 
therefore, neither could the present study.  
The layout of Reinhart and Rogoff’s Table A3 also makes it difficult to 
determine the intended dates for one observation each in Slovenia and Macedonia, 
but these are both entered as 1992 based on the context of table. One observation in 
Myanmar is dropped because the Penn World Tables, described in the following 
subsection, do not contain data for Myanmar, Burma or any variation thereof. One 
country-year observation of “Congo – 1992” is dropped because it cannot be 
determined which country this is meant to represent during that time period. 
 
Data Source 2: Penn World Tables, Version 6.3 
Country macroeconomic data is drawn from Version 6.3 of the Penn World 
Tables. This includes basic statistics for real per capita gross domestic product (real 
per capita GDP), trade openness (synonymously, “trade volume”), and population.  
PWT’s data for “China Version 1” is favored because it represents the 
“official” reporting of China’s data, and does not rely on the PWT developers’ 
estimates which produced “China Version 2”(Heston). 
PWT’s updated “RGDPL2” measurement of per capita GDP is employed 
because its designers claim that resulting growth calculations are more stable between 
versions of PWT, although this is not of direct concern to the present study 
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(Heston). Linear regressions are run on the natural log of this per capita GDP 
measurement, so coefficients can be easily interpreted as rates of change. 
 
Data Description 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s data are merged with the full Penn World Tables 
(PWT), Version 6.3, using Stata statistical software. Country names are amended to 
conform to PWT coding. The resulting merged panel dataset is strongly balanced, 
and includes 153 distinct country-crisis combinations as sample observations. This 
study does not attempt to account for contagion effects. For example, if a banking 
crisis originates in one country, but allegedly causes a banking crisis in another 
country, both country-crises are counted as separate observations. The resulting 
sample dataset is provided in the Appendix as Tables 3A and 3B, organized 
respectively by chronology and by country.  
 As the end date of a given crisis is very difficult to discern, and no unified 
data exists to measure crisis duration, in this study a country is considered to be in a 
“post-crisis” state for the crisis initial year plus the 10 following years. Therefore, the 
post_crisis variable is coded as a dummy that takes on the value 1 for the crisis initial 
year plus the ten following years. 
For every observation of an initial crisis year in a given country, data is 
examined over the time interval from 10 years prior to the crisis onset, through 10 
years following the crisis onset, i.e., for 21 years total including the crisis initial year. 
Multiplying by the 153 unique crisis observations; subtracting out overlap between 
instances of frequent crises within a single country; and then subtracting unavailable 
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years near the beginning and at the end of the dataset for which no further data 
exists, yields 2706 country-year observations in the study sample. 
The “openness” variable in this study is the five-year average of a country’s 
PWT “openk” statistic, taken over the four years leading up to a given country-crisis 
plus the crisis initial year. This was done in an effort to neutralize possible, unknown 
effects of impending crisis on the openness variable, and also to reduce the effects of 
random year-to-year variation in country openness. PWT calculates openness as an 
indexed proportion of country real GDP, in constant dollars, as openk = [(Exports 
+ Imports) / GDP] x 100.  
Table 2 contains the table of means for the main regression’s datasets. The 
first column gives a concise description of each variable, how each is calculated, how 
each is coded, and what assumptions underlie them, where applicable. For each 
variable, values were calculated for its arithmetic mean; standard deviation (S.D.); 
number of observations (n); and its minimum and maximum values in the data to 
impart a sense of scale or range.  
The column labeled “Study Sample” lists these calculations based only on the 
restricted sample dataset which produced the main regression table found in Table 1, 
the model and inferential results for which are discussed in the following Sections III 
and IV. The column labeled “Full PWT,” standing for “Full Penn World Tables,” 
calculates the same statistics for the entirety of the Penn World Tables macro panel 
data, without dropping any observations. Therefore the number of observations (n) 
is higher in the Full PWT column than in the Study Sample column for any given 
variable.  
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Table 2 allows the reader to judge potential selection bias based on 
differences between the sample and population dataset characteristics. The means of 
some variables were altered considerably by sample selection. “Post_crisis” and 
“years_since_crisis,” for example, display expectedly sharp jumps in their means, 
because the study sample focuses only on country-years in proximity to a crisis.
 Country population headcount mean increased considerably as well, from 
about 28 million in the full PWT to nearly 43 million in the study sample, a possible 
warning that country size may be distorting regression results. However, mean real 
per capita GDP changes only modestly, from $8,690 down to about $7,970 in the 
study sample, and with smaller standard deviation. The means and standard 
deviations for the natural log of real per capita GDP remain nearly identical between 
the study sample and the full dataset.   
The mean of PWT’s annual openness measurement, “openk,” shrinks by a 
modest 10 index points in the study sample. Observations on the change in mean for 
this study’s five-year average pre-crisis openness measurement, “openness,” are of 
limited use, however, since this statistic is only calculated in pre-crisis years. 
On balance, the study sample appears only minimally biased in most 
meaningful comparisons with its population means.  
Table 3A tabulates the 153 study sample country-crisis initial year 
observations in chronological order. Cursory examination shows that many crisis 
initial years were shared widely by several countries, making a strong case for the 
inclusion of year fixed effects controls in the regression. A number of these “bad 
years” include groups of countries in obvious geographical proximity, like the 
African countries in 1988 and 1992, or Asian Pacific countries in 1997, perhaps 
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indicating contagion effects. But these are often joined by one or more countries not 
geographically grouped, or even obviously economically integrated. 
Table 3B organizes the same country-crisis sample data by country, allowing 
ready observation of “serial” crises within a particular country. Many countries on 
the list appear only two or three times, but their banking crises often fall within a 
decade of one another. In this study, these situations are considered serial crises in 
the sense that their average “openness” statistics are retained from the earlier crisis if 
10 recovery years had not passed before the subsequent crisis.  
 
III. Model 
 
The regressions designed for this study are modeled as follows: 
	 
         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 "#  #$%  & 
where the vector x varies across five different specifications, each specification 
progressively including an additional control. The first specification includes no 
controls. The second includes a time trend control. The third adds country fixed 
effects. The fourth adds country-specific trends. The fifth adds year fixed effects. 
Autocorrelation issues were partially addressed by clustering by country-decades. The 
controls included in each specification are also summarized in Table 1 of the 
Appendix, with the regression results.  
The interaction term between openness and a country’s post-crisis status 
represents the one-time level-shift effect of trade openness on a country’s real per 
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capita GDP given that a banking crisis has taken place within the past 10 years. This 
is compared with the per capita GDP level-shift effect of the post_crisis variable by 
itself, i.e., at openness = 0, or trade autarky, in the Results section. The 
years_since_crisis variable and its interaction term with openness also receive closer 
attention in the Results section below as descriptions of a country’s recovery from 
economic crisis in the absence or presence of trade openness. The openness variable 
by itself is of little use in this study due to the inclusion of country fixed effects and a 
large degree of multicollinearity in the panel data, but it is included for completeness.   
Because the data included some countries which experienced frequent, or 
serial crises, mean openness was only recalculated for a country if more than 10 years 
had passed since that country’s last crisis. This was done in an effort to eliminate 
possible disruptive effects of a crisis on openness, which in turn may have helped 
precipitate another crisis in rapid succession. Table 3B in the Appendix sorts the 
sample country crises by country and then by year to help identify when and where 
these serial crises took place.  
 
IV. Results 
 Table 1 in the Appendix tabulates the main regression results from this study. 
The first column lists each regressor, detailed descriptions for which can also be 
quickly referenced in the first column of Table 2. All coefficients represent the 
effects of the regressor on the natural log of real per capita GDP, so these results 
may be interpreted directly as rates of change on per capita GDP. Robust standard 
errors appear below each coefficient in parentheses, and results that are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level appear with two asterisks.  
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Each column numbered (1) through (5) represents a new specification with 
an additional control variable added. Column (1), or specification 1, contains no 
controls, and specifications 2 through 5 add one control each, as described above in 
the Model section. Toward the bottom of Table 1 is a Controls checklist to indicate 
which control variables are active in each specification. The discussion below focuses 
on specifications 4 and 5, favoring specification 5 with its full complement of 
controls.  
In Table 1, regression coefficients and standard errors involving the 
openness variable (openness, openness*post_crisis and openness*years_since_crisis) 
are multiplied by a factor of 100 to describe the effect on GDP resulting from an 
increase of 100 openness index points. This is done to express how economies with 
very different levels of openness may fare very differently through financial crises, 
rather than fixating on the relatively trivial effects of single openness index point 
changes.  
The results from this study can be split into two major categories: those 
concerning an economy’s ability to resist the initial “shock” of a crisis onset, and 
those concerning an economy’s ability to recover afterward. Coefficients on the 
post_crisis dummy variable, which is coded as 1 for a country crisis initial year and 
the 10 subsequent country-years, represent the one-time level-shift downward, or 
shock, to real per capita GDP resulting from a banking crisis, given that openness = 
0. The coefficient on the interaction term of openness with this post_crisis variable 
may then be thought of as a measurement of the GDP “shock resistance” provided 
per 100 additional index points of trade volume. 
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Coefficients on the years_since_crisis variable, coded 1 through 10 for the 10 
country-years following the crisis onset year, may be interpreted as the average 
annual recovery effect on real per capita GDP of the passage of time during the 
post-crisis period given that openness = 0. The interaction term between this and the 
openness variable then describes the GDP recovery effect of 100 additional index 
points of trade volume. As noted above, the openness variable by itself is of little use 
in this study due to the inclusion of country fixed effects and a large degree of 
multicollinearity in the panel data, but it is included in Table 1 completeness.    
In terms of “shock resistance,” linear regression results provide suggestive 
evidence that greater trade volume, interacted with the recent occurrence of a 
banking crisis, may have a large, positive effect on real per capita GDP. With all 
controls included (specification 5), a 100 point openness index increase caused an 
average increase of approximately 2.3% per capita GDP when interacted with the 
presence of a banking crisis. A change from autarky (index zero) to high openness 
(index 100), for example, would then substantially offset the average negative effect 
of a banking crisis at openness = 0, approximately -6.9% per capita GDP. However, 
this measurement is imprecise, with robust standard errors of approximately 0.022, 
or 2.2% of per capita GDP.  
 In terms of recovery effects, greater trade openness may aid in the recovery 
of per capita GDP following a banking crisis. Again with all controls included, at 
openness = 0, the average annual effect of each of the ten years following a crisis is -
0.2% GDP per capita, approaching statistical significance with robust standard errors 
of 0.17% GDP per capita. This gives the 10-year recovery period in autarky a total 
impact of -2.0% GDP per capita. Interacting openness with years-since-crisis, 
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however, yields an average increase of 0.3% per capita GDP per annum, per 100 
openness index points, during the recovery period. This measurement is less precise, 
however, with robust standard errors of 0.33% GDP per capita. In other words, a 
banking crisis may put lasting, downward pressure on GDP if no trade is allowed, 
but increasing openness can reverse the effect into a the positive recovery that one 
would intuitively expect.  
For the post_crisis, years_since_crisis, openness*years_since_crisis and  
openness regressors in Table 1, little change occurs between specifications 4 and 5 
with the addition of year fixed effects. The coefficient on openness*post_crisis 
interaction term, however, is increased by nearly an order of magnitude from 0.39% 
GDP per capita to 2.31% GDP per capita, while its robust standard errors remain 
stable, shifting only from 2.24% GDP per capita to 2.19% GDP per capita to boost 
precision considerably. I favor specification 5 because it controls for worldwide 
economic shocks in certain years, which may be correlated with the incidence of 
banking crises.  
To explain this scenario of trade volume providing some sort of cushioning 
during a financial crisis, I hypothesize that countries with proportionally high pre-
crisis trade volumes would also naturally possess better infrastructure to execute 
trade transactions, like extensive ports, roadways and legal authorities. It would be 
faster and easier for countries so equipped to pursue familiar trade-oriented growth 
policies to stave off recession in case of emergency. These might include classic 
export-led growth policies, which would bring a tandem benefit of foreign exchange 
inflows that could help alleviate foreign-exchange related financial crises (Montiel 
Ch. 19). The greater variety and availability of cheaper, imported substitute goods 
13 
 
 
often implied by greater trade volume might also help to increase real income, 
propping up the consumption component of GDP during a recession. Open trade 
might then be thought of more as a pressure release valve for an economy in crisis, 
rather than a cushion.  
The idea that a banking crisis could cause permanent damage to income 
recovery in a closed economy is harder to explain, although it is intriguing. If true, 
this phenomenon may lend credence to the idea that some exogenous policy kick-
start or stimulus of the varieties just discussed is needed to overcome the breakdown 
of credit availability and general macro sluggishness attendant to banking sector 
crises, which would be more difficult in a closed economy. Strong negative 
correlation between relative trade volume and country (economic) size might indicate 
that smaller economies somehow recover faster, although this could probably be 
argued either way. Fortunately, many of these hypotheses can be readily, 
quantitatively examined in future research.  
   
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper explores the possibility of previously unrecognized benefits to 
trade openness or increased trade volume. If this study’s predictions can be 
confirmed, they would increase precision when calculating the national costs and 
benefits of an open economy. Similarly, the results of this study suggest that 
policymakers may be able to improve financial crisis management strategies by 
incorporating policy elements that increase trade openness. 
The results of this study are not conclusive, but do suggest some positive 
relationship between a country’s economic openness and its ability to weather 
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banking crises. This line of research contains rich opportunities for expansion: 
similar experiments could be run on various prototype measurements for financial 
openness, and other varieties of financial crisis could be examined with respect to 
trade openness.  
All decisions to increase economic openness involve political and economic 
tradeoffs. If the financial crisis-mitigating effects of economic openness suggested in 
the present study hold true, then policies which reduce trade barriers or otherwise 
encourage trade become more attractive. This is particularly relevant in the wake of 
the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, as national governments worldwide seek to 
improve crisis mitigation strategies. Furthermore, openness is a convenient policy 
tool because trade policies are set almost exclusively by national governments.  
The exact mechanism whereby trade openness might have a positive effect 
on GDP given the special case of financial crisis is not readily apparent. Trade 
openness may be acting as a proxy for some form of market flexibility that allows 
recovery of consumption or income during crises through imports and exports. Or 
trade openness may have some positive correlation with financial openness, the 
upshot being that more financially open countries may have more options available 
for crisis management. It is also possible that openness in trade serves as an indicator 
of generally competent macro policy management. Further study is merited to 
explore these possible relationships with greater precision.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Effects on ln_(Real GDP Per Capita) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
openness * post_crisis Coefficient 0.00249 0.00204 -0.00284 0.00379 0.02307 
Robust S.E. (0.33112) (0.32749) (0.05798) (0.02239) (0.02186) 
openness * years_since_crisis -0.01306 -0.01315 0.00128 0.00468 0.00358 
(0.04935) (0.04905) (0.00725) (0.00350) (0.00332) 
post_crisis 0.02248 0.03785 -0.08616** -0.05298** -0.06909** 
(0.19878 (0.20134) (0.03167) (0.01206) (0.01133) 
years_since_crisis 0.02358 0.02607 -0.00627 -0.00311 -0.00251 
(0.02927) (0.03053) (0.00481) (0.00200) (0.00174) 
openness -0.24206 -0.23627 -1.00425 -1.66628** -1.66254** 
(0.21129) (0.21404) (0.72694) (0.45326) (0.26134) 
Controls             
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific Trends Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects           Yes 
** Indicates significance at the .05 level 
Coefficients involving openness represent change in real GDP resulting from shift of openness index from 0 to 100. 
Multiply values by 100 for percentage terms. 
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Description Variable Study Sample Full PWT
openness * post_crisis Mean 30.31063 7.65467
S.D. 39.46985 20.13385
n 2,326 3,132
Min 0 0
Max 263.50700 154.06220
openness * years_since_crisis Mean 152.79180 38.76684
S.D. 251.20730 120.30200
n 2,326 3,132
Min 0 0
Max 2,635.07000 1,540.62200
post_crisis Mean 0.56024 0.13617
S.D. 0.49645 0.34299
n 2,706 11,133
Min 0 0
Max 1 1
Interaction term between the 
openness and years_since_crisis 
variables, described below.
Dummy that equals 1 for the 
crisis initial year, plus each of 
the 10 country-years following, 
else zero.
Table 2: Table of Means
Interaction term between the 
openness and post_crisis 
variables, described below.
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Description Variable Study Sample Full PWT
years_since_crisis Mean 2.85625 0.69424
S.D. 3.45208 2.09686
n 2,706 11,133
Min 0 0
Max 10 10
openness Mean 54.75419 40.55592
S.D. 39.64436 33.82387
n 2,326 3,132
Min 11.15646 4.03423
Max 263.50700 154.06220
openk Mean 63.53839 73.49245
S.D. 43.88846 51.11964
n 2,573 8,425
Min 5.89028 1.08602
Max 398.95360 622.62630
Table 2: Table of Means (Continued)
Takes on values 1 through 10 
for each of the 10 country-years 
following a country-crisis initial 
year, else zero. 
Average of Penn World Tables 
"openk" variable over the four 
country-years preceding a 
country-crisis initial year, plus 
the country-crisis initial year.
Penn World Tables index for 
trade openness, calculated as 
[(Exports + Imports) / Real 
GDP] x100.
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Description Variable Study Sample Full PWT
population Mean 42,739,390.00 28,038,730
S.D. 132,456,700.00 115,289,900
n 2,706 11,020
Min 96,443 7,251
Max 1,284,276,000 1,321,852,000
Real GDP Per Capita Mean 7,968.79 8,690.68
(PWT: "RGDPL2") S.D. 8,222.60 10,897.51
n 2,573 8,425
Min 154.10 154.10
Max 83,315.05 110,593.20
ln_(Real GDP Per Capita) Mean 8.48592 8.45088
S.D. 1.04647 1.13506
n 2,573 8,425
Min 5.03758 5.03758
Max 11.33038 11.61361
Penn World Tables, Real Gross 
Domestic Product Per Capita in 
constant dollars. Laspeyeres 
fixed base index with reference 
year 1996.
Natural log of Real Gross 
Domestic Product Per Capita in 
constant dollars (natual log of 
Penn World Tables 
"RGDPL2").
Table 2: Table of Means (Continued)
Penn World Tables population 
head-count.
[
[
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Brazil 1963 
Uruguay 1971 
United Kingdom  1974 
Chile 1976 
Central African Republic 1976 
Germany 1977 
Israel 1977 
Spain 1977 
South Africa 1977 
Venezuela 1978 
Argentina 1980 
Chile 1980 
Ecuador 1980 
Egypt 1980 
Mexico 1981 
Philippines 1981 
Uruguay 1981 
Hong Kong 1982 
Singapore 1982 
Colombia 1982 
Turkey 1982 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1982 
Ghana 1982 
Canada 1983 
Korea, Republic of 1983 
Kuwait 1983 
Taiwan 1983 
Morocco 1983 
Peru 1983 
Thailand 1983 
Equatorial Guinea 1983 
Niger 1983 
United Kingdom  1984 
United States 1984 
Mauritania 1984 
Argentina 1985 
Brazil 1985 
Malaysia 1985 
Guinea 1985 
Kenya 1985 
Denmark  1987 
New Zealand 1987 
Norway 1987 
Bolivia 1987 
Cameroon 1987 
Costa Rica 1987 
Nicaragua 1987 
Bangladesh  1987 
Mali 1987 
Mozambique 1987 
Tanzania 1987 
Lebanon 1988 
Panama 1988 
Benin 1988 
Burkina Faso 1988 
Central African Republic 1988 
Cote d`Ivoire 1988 
Madagascar 1988 
Nepal 1988 
Senegal 1988 
Australia 1989 
Argentina 1989 
El Salvador  1989 
South Africa 1989 
Sri Lanka 1989 
Italy 1990 
Algeria 1990 
Brazil 1990 
Egypt 1990 
Table 3A: Beginning Dates of Sample Banking Crises in Chronological Order 
21 
 
 
Romania 1990 
Sierra Leone 1990 
Czech Republic 1991 
Finland 1991 
Greece 1991 
Sweden 1991 
United Kingdom  1991 
Georgia 1991 
Hungary 1991 
Poland 1991 
Slovak Republic 1991 
Djibouti 1991 
Liberia 1991 
Sao Tome and Principe 1991 
Japan 1992 
Slovenia 1992 
Macedonia 1992 
Albania 1992 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 
Estonia 1992 
Indonesia 1992 
Angola 1992 
Chad 1992 
China 1992 
Kenya 1992 
Nigeria 1992 
Cape Verde 1993 
Venezuela 1993 
Guinea 1993 
Eritrea 1993 
India 1993 
Kyrgyzstan 1993 
Togo 1993 
France  1994 
Armenia 1994 
Bolivia 1994 
Bulgaria 1994 
Costa Rica 1994 
Jamaica 1994 
Latvia 1994 
Mexico 1994 
Turkey 1994 
Burundi 1994 
Congo, Republic of 1994 
Uganda 1994 
United Kingdom  1995 
Argentina 1995 
Azerbaijan  1995 
Brazil 1995 
Cameroon 1995 
Lithuania 1995 
Paraguay  1995 
Russia 1995 
Swaziland 1995 
Guinea-Bissau 1995 
Zambia 1995 
Zimbabwe 1995 
Croatia 1996 
Ecuador 1996 
Thailand 1996 
Yemen 1996 
Taiwan 1997 
Indonesia 1997 
Korea, Republic of 1997 
Malaysia 1997 
Mauritius 1997 
Philippines 1997 
Ukraine 1997 
Vietnam 1997 
Table 3A: Beginning Dates of Sample Banking Crises in Chronological Order (Continued) 
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Colombia 1998 
Ecuador 1998 
El Salvador  1998 
Russia 1998 
Bolivia 1999 
Honduras 1999 
Peru 1999 
Nicaragua  2000 
Argentina 2001 
Guatemala 2001 
Paraguay  2002 
Uruguay  2002 
Dominican Republic 2003 
Guatemala 2006 
United States 2007 
Adapted from Reinhart and Rogoff, Table A3 (2008) 
"China" represents PWT "China Version 1" 
Table 3A: Beginning Dates of Sample Banking Crises in Chronological Order (Continued) 
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Albania 1992 
Algeria 1990 
Angola 1992 
Argentina 1980 
Argentina 1985 
Argentina 1989 
Argentina 1995 
Argentina 2001 
Armenia 1994 
Australia 1989 
Azerbaijan  1995 
Bangladesh  1987 
Benin 1988 
Bolivia 1987 
Bolivia 1994 
Bolivia 1999 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 
Brazil 1963 
Brazil 1985 
Brazil 1990 
Brazil 1995 
Bulgaria 1994 
Burkina Faso 1988 
Burundi 1994 
Cameroon 1987 
Cameroon 1995 
Canada 1983 
Cape Verde 1993 
Central African Republic 1976 
Central African Republic 1988 
Chad 1992 
Chile 1976 
Chile 1980 
China 1992 
Colombia 1982 
Colombia 1998 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1982 
Congo, Republic of 1994 
Costa Rica 1987 
Costa Rica 1994 
Cote d`Ivoire 1988 
Croatia 1996 
Czech Republic 1991 
Denmark  1987 
Djibouti 1991 
Dominican Republic 2003 
Ecuador 1980 
Ecuador 1996 
Ecuador 1998 
Egypt 1980 
Egypt 1990 
El Salvador  1989 
El Salvador  1998 
Equatorial Guinea 1983 
Eritrea 1993 
Estonia 1992 
Finland 1991 
France  1994 
Georgia 1991 
Germany 1977 
Ghana 1982 
Greece 1991 
Guatemala 2001 
Guatemala 2006 
Guinea 1985 
Guinea 1993 
Guinea-Bissau 1995 
Honduras 1999 
Hong Kong 1982 
Table 3B: Beginning Dates of Sample Banking Crises Sorted by Country 
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Hungary 1991 
India 1993 
Indonesia 1992 
Indonesia 1997 
Israel 1977 
Italy 1990 
Jamaica 1994 
Japan 1992 
Kenya 1985 
Kenya 1992 
Korea, Republic of 1983 
Korea, Republic of 1997 
Kuwait 1983 
Kyrgyzstan 1993 
Latvia 1994 
Lebanon 1988 
Liberia 1991 
Lithuania 1995 
Macedonia 1992 
Madagascar 1988 
Malaysia 1985 
Malaysia 1997 
Mali 1987 
Mauritania 1984 
Mauritius 1997 
Mexico 1981 
Mexico 1994 
Morocco 1983 
Mozambique 1987 
Nepal 1988 
New Zealand 1987 
Nicaragua 1987 
Nicaragua  2000 
Niger 1983 
Nigeria 1992 
Norway 1987 
Panama 1988 
Paraguay  1995 
Paraguay  2002 
Peru 1983 
Peru 1999 
Philippines 1981 
Philippines 1997 
Poland 1991 
Romania 1990 
Russia 1995 
Russia 1998 
Sao Tome and Principe 1991 
Senegal 1988 
Sierra Leone 1990 
Singapore 1982 
Slovak Republic 1991 
Slovenia 1992 
South Africa 1977 
South Africa 1989 
Spain 1977 
Sri Lanka 1989 
Swaziland 1995 
Sweden 1991 
Taiwan 1983 
Taiwan 1997 
Tanzania 1987 
Thailand 1983 
Thailand 1996 
Togo 1993 
Turkey 1982 
Turkey 1994 
Uganda 1994 
Ukraine 1997 
Table 3B: Beginning Dates of Sample Banking Crises Sorted by Country (Continued) 
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United Kingdom  1974 
United Kingdom  1984 
United Kingdom  1991 
United Kingdom  1995 
United States 1984 
United States 2007 
Uruguay 1971 
Uruguay 1981 
Uruguay  2002 
Venezuela 1978 
Venezuela 1993 
Vietnam 1997 
Yemen 1996 
Zambia 1995 
Zimbabwe 1995 
Adapted from Reinhart and Rogoff, Table A3 (2008) 
"China" represents PWT "China Version 1" 
Table 3B: Beginning Dates of Sample Banking Crises Sorted by Country (Continued) 
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The Effects of Trade Openness on Per Capita GDP during Banking Crises 
In the field of financial crisis analysis, attention is mainly focused on financial 
variables. Trade balance is sometimes addressed as a component of the current 
account balance, but trade openness – a country’s relative volume of trade – is 
seldom discussed. Meanwhile, the effects of trade openness on long-term GDP 
growth, development and productivity have been studied extensively, with mixed 
results. This study attempts to identify a linkage between the economic openness 
literature and financial crisis literature, which have largely remained separate. To 
accomplish this, the present study examines the historical effects of trade openness 
in the special case of banking crisis.  
This gap in the literature is understandable, as trade volume at first seems less 
important than trade balance. Yet even elementary economic models, like 
Investment Saving/Liquidity preference Money supply-Balance of Payments (ISLM-
BOP), Mundell-Fleming and their descendants, illustrate fundamental links between 
the real economy and financial markets. It is plausible then that real economic 
variables like trade openness deserve more careful examination in the analysis of 
financial crisis. 
Large, macroeconomic datasets were merged with a list of country-years 
combinations in which banking crises occurred. Statistical regressions were then run 
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on the interaction term formed by a country’s economic openness given the recent 
occurrence of a banking crisis. Data sources for the report consisted of the Penn 
World Tables (Version 6.3) for country macroeconomic panel data (multiple 
countries over approximately 60 years); and Table A3 of Reinhart and Rogoff’s 2008 
paper, “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial 
Crisis,” cataloging the initiation years of historical banking crises and which countries 
were primarily affected. To account for the idea that banking and other financial 
crises ostensibly have some fundamental incubation period before their apparent 
onset, the openness measure entered into the regression represents an average over 
the four preceding years plus the initial year of each unique country-crisis episode.  
Linear, statistical regression models provide suggestive evidence that greater 
trade volume, interacted with the recent occurrence of a banking crisis, may have a 
large, positive effect on real per capita GDP. A 100 point openness index increase 
causes an average increase of approximately 2.3% per capita GDP when interacted 
with the presence of a banking crisis. A change from autarky (index zero) to high 
openness (index 100), for example, substantially offsets the average negative effect of 
a banking crisis at openness = 0, approximately -6.9% per capita GDP. However, 
this measurement is imprecise, with robust standard errors of approximately 0.022, 
or 2.2% of per capita GDP.  
 Additionally, greater trade openness may aid in the recovery of per capita 
GDP following a banking crisis. At openness = 0, the average annual effect of each 
of the ten years following a crisis is -0.2% GDP per capita, approaching statistical 
significance with robust standard errors of 0.17% GDP per capita, giving the 10-year 
recovery period a total impact of -2.0% GDP per capita. Interacting openness with 
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years-since-crisis, however, yields an average increase of 0.3% per capita GDP per 
annum, per 100 openness index points, during the recovery period. This 
measurement is less precise, however, with robust standard errors of 0.33% GDP 
per capita. In other words, a banking crisis may put lasting, downward pressure on 
GDP if no trade is allowed. 
The exact mechanism whereby trade openness might have a greater, positive 
effect on GDP given the special case of financial crisis is not readily apparent, and 
could merit further study. Trade openness may be acting as a proxy for some form 
of market flexibility that allows recovery of consumption or income during crises 
through imports and exports. Or trade openness may have some positive correlation 
with financial openness, the upshot being that more financially open countries may 
have more options available for crisis management. It is also possible that openness 
in trade and finance serve as indicators of generally competent macro policy 
management. But if economic openness by itself possesses some virtue of crisis 
mitigation, policies that reduce trade barriers or actively encourage international trade 
become that much more attractive.  
The results of this study are not conclusive, but do suggest some positive 
relationship between a country’s economic openness and its ability to weather 
banking crises. This line of research contains rich opportunities for expansion: 
similar experiments could be run on various prototype measurements for financial 
openness, and other varieties of financial crisis could be examined beyond banking 
crises.  
 
 
